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SYNOPSIS 
One of the most persistent themes in the literature on the management of 
technology-based innovation relates to the need to balance “technology-push” with 
“market-pull”. There is a large body of evidence to indicate that, for relatively 
small innovations at least, there is a broad correlation between the success of new 
product innovations and the extent to which their development is market-led, and 
based on this evidence a number of writers have advocated the general desirability 
of marketing-led approaches to research and development. Others, however, have 
argued for the opposite position, drawing attention to the dangers of a market-push 
approach, especially where substantial innovations may be required. 
From this debate have emerged two stereotypes, of the technology-led firm 
developing and designing products that nobody wants to buy and of the marketing 
led firm unable to generate the new technology opportunities needed to safeguard 
its long term future, and a variety of recipes for success based on a close and 
constructive relationship between the marketing and research and development 
functions. The general consensus, revealed by developments in practice over the 
last 20 years, has been in favour of either a matrix organization for research and 
development or a project-based organization in which individual project or venture 
groups cut across the functional divisions of the organization. In recent years 
these structural recipes have been combined with a range of cultural prescriptions 
based on the cultural context of innovation in successful firms.For many companies 
such recipes and prescriptions appear to have been successful, but for many others, 
they remain almost impossible to enact. A review of the existing literature 
indicates a range of major problems encountered in this respect, both in the 
operation of the prescribed organizational forms and, more generally, in the attempt 
to reconcile a number of apparently conflicting organizational needs. 
In this paper we disaggregate the problem of managing technological product 
innovation into two separate problems, one concerned with fundamental research and 
the other with new product line development, and argue that in neither context is 
the concept of technology-push particularly helpful. In the case of the development 
process on which we concentrate we argue that this concept is indeed quite 
inappropriate. Drawing on a series of major in-depth historical studies of the new 
product design and development process, we show that the key driving force in 
opposition to market needs is not technology per se but the political and cultural 
organization of the firm. The situation with which we are faced is not one of 
technological determinism, but of socially created and maintained technological 
preferences. Moreover we show that the problem is not one of imposing organiza- 
tional control but rather one of freeing the development process from cultural and 
political constraints, and especially from those reinforced by political conflict, and 
to this extent the concept of a marketing-led approach is itself misleading. 
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Central to our core analysis is the analysis of the forces which determine which of 
a variety of possible technologies are to be applied in a design and development 
process, and how. These forces are, we argue, predominantly social, reflecting the 
objectives, values, experiences and political structures of the sub-organizations 
involved and the political structures of the relationships between them. We are 
therefore led to relate our problem to studies of the politico-cultural problems of 
implementing change in organizations, and to interpret the existing literature on the 
management of innovation and of related interfunctional relationships from a 
politico-cultural perspective. This perspective, combined with the emphasis upon 
freedom from constraints rather than the imposition of controls, suggests that the 
key to the successful and practical management of innovation lies in the develop- 
ment of the marketing and research and development functions rather than in the 
development of organizational structure, a conclusion which is finally illustrated and 
supported by a review of the observed practices of successful technology-based 
firms. 
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Introduction: review and Droblems 
One of the more persistent themes in the 
literature on the management of 
technology- based firms has concerned the 
dangers of a technology-driven approach 
to the management of innovation, and the 
need for a strong marketing lead. In the 
1970s attention focused on the need to 
combine marketing and technology inputs 
in the innovation process, with the 
emphasis on structural procedures such as 
the introduction of matrix organizations or 
project teams. In the last decade the 
emphasis has shifted to include the need 
for internal competition and strong 
corporate cultures with a commitment to 
innovation alongside the structural recipes, 
but with marketing playing if anything a 
stronger, though perhaps less formal role. 
There is now a large body of evidence to 
indicate that, for relatively small 
innovations at least, there is a broad 
correlation between the success of new 
product innovations and the extent to 
which their development is marketing or 
user led. In the course of a major 
quantitative study of two hundred R&D 
projects in three large industrial labora- 
tories, Mansfield and collaborators (1971) 
found that it was much more likely that a 
project would meet its technical aims than 
that it would generate an economic profit 
having done so. The commercial risks were 
much greater than the technical ones. 
They also found that these commercial 
risks were significantly reduced when 
there were inputs from ’ the marketing 
function at an early stage of the project 
development decision-making process. 
Following up on this Mansfield and Wagner 
(1975) found in a study of 16 firms con- 
siderable evidence that success was 
affected by the speed with which a 
product was analyzed from a marketing 
viewpoint. 
Meanwhile Marquis had drawn similar 
conclusions from a study of 500 “nuts and 
bolts” innovations (Marquis, 1969; 
Utterback, 197 1 ), concluding in particular 
that successful innovations were 
characterized by a prior recognition of 
market demand. About half of the 
innovations analyzed, all of which had 
been identified by the firms concerned as 
their most important new products or 
processes, were initiated in response to 
market needs, while over a quarter were 
in response to production needs. Only a 
fifth arose from new technological 
opportunities. In a study of 47 small 
high-tech Canadian firms, Litvak and 
Maule (1972) observed that “the love that 
the entrepreneur has for his product 
innovation often blinds him from 
perceiving his real opportunities and the 
state of market competition”, and 
concluded that the lack of a strong 
marketing input was the main problem 
faced in the innovation process. In another 
major study carried out in the 197Os, 
project SAPPHO, Rothwell and col- 
laborators analyzed 29 matched pairs of 
innovations (one successful, the other not) 
in the chemicals and scientific instruments 
industries on 200 different measures. They 
found that the principal measure 
distinguishing between success and failure 
was an understanding of user needs at an 
early stage of the project (Freeman, 1982; 
Rothwell, 1974). In a study of 114 new 
industrial products, Cooper (1975) found 
that while much less was spent on 
marketing than on R&D, marketing rather 
than technical reasons were the prime 
causes of failure, with 2/3 of all product 
failures being attributed to a lack of 
marketing skills. 
These conclusions have been further 
supported by the work of Utterback 
(1974), von Hippel (1976, 1978, 1982) and 
Quinn (1985), and in the last few years 
two more major studies have reinforced 
the message. Cooper and Kleinschmidt 
(1987) studied 203 new product innovations 
in 115 companies and isolated the leading 
predictors of three different measures of 
success: financial performance, opportunity 
window, and market share. For the first 
measure the leading predictor of success 
was that customer needs and preferences 
were well defined before the product 
development. For the second measure the 
leading predictor was the perceived ability 
of the product to perform a unique task, 
another market criterion. And on the 
third measure the leading predictor was 
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that the product was superior to and of 
higher quality than rival products in the 
eyes of the customers. Of the top ten 
predictors from each measure only a few 
were not market-based. Finally a large 
study of the post-innovation performance 
of 35 technology award winning firms by 
Georghiou and collaborators ( 1986) 
highlighted the need for firms to keep 
within the “corridor” of user requirements 
if the firm was to survive and prosper. 
On the strength of these studies it is 
tempting to conclude that the innovation 
process should in general be market-led. 
But as most of the researchers have 
themselves recognized this conclusion 
needs to be qualified. The first 
qualification to be made is that the major 
studies have been concerned with 
relatively small, incremental innovations, 
and not with large technological 
breakthroughs, or major new enabling 
technologies. As Marquis (1969) has 
pointed out, small innovations do 
contribute significantly to commercial 
success, but it would clearly be perverse 
to exclude larger innovations altogether. 
And, as Tauber (1975, 1979) and others 
have pointed out, these larger innovations 
could be seriously endangered by the early 
application of market-based criteria. Even 
for essentially non-technological product 
innovations such as new confectionery 
items, attitudes revealed by early market 
research are not in general good 
predictors of later adoption behaviour. 
Where major new technologies are 
concerned it is often impossible to predict 
anything about the potential market until 
users have had some experience with the 
product. In the early days of computer 
development, for example, a number of 
authoritative experts concurred in placing 
the world market for computers at about 4 
or 5 units (Hendry, 1989). IBM turned 
down the photocopier invention twice 
before Xerox took it up because they 
couldn’t see a market for it (Dessauer, 
1971). And while discussing the 
marketing-oriented handling of new 
product development processes in Japanese 
industry, Imae and others (1984) have 
identified the closure to major breakthr- 
oughs as a principal limitation of an 
otherwise exemplary approach. 
Even where smaller innovations are 
concerned, a market-pull approach can be 
as dangerous as a technology-push one. 
Little and Sweeting (1984), studying new 
business developments in mature firms, 
noted a tendency to get carried away by a 
product concept for which there was no 
appropriate technology alongside the more 
commonly noted tendency to get carried 
away by a technological idea for which 
there was no appropriate market. 
Georghiou and collaborators also noted 
that the technology-based firms in their 
study needed to maintain their technologi- 
cal inventiveness as well as keeping their 
eye on the market place if they were to 
survive. Voss (1984) noted that innovations 
arising from user requirements were 
themselves dominated by technology push. 
And Gupta and others (1985, 1988), 
following Blois and Cowell (1979), have 
drawn attention to the point that market 
failures of technology-generated 
innovations may arise as much from the 
failure of the marketing department to 
find a way of exploiting these as from 
their intrinsic un-marketability. 
As Little (1979 and see also Cooper and 
Little, 1977) has observed, there is a 
tendency for firms which develop new- 
technology-based products to be relatively 
weak on the marketing side, and indeed to 
put less effort into marketing than other 
firms, and to some extent the advocacy of 
a marketing-led approach to innovation is 
certainly appropriate. But the major 
conclusion drawn by the researchers from 
the studies mentioned above concerns the 
need for a close and constructive 
relationship between the marketing and 
R&D functions. Thus, for example, 
Mansfield and Wagner (1975) concluded 
that the probability of commercialisation 
of innovations was directly related to the 
degree to which the marketing and R&D 
functions were integrated. Mansfield 
(1971:210-211) argued that “the problem of 
properly coupling R&D with marketing 
cannot be overemphasised.” Freeman 
(1982), on the basis of the SAPPHO 
results, argued that “innovation is 
essentially a coupling process”, and that 
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(1963) was the first to make the\assertion 
that a  successful innovation path typ$ally++/s 
hinged on a product champion operatinrag 
a senior enough level in the firm  to 
effectively sponsor thf innovation and 
overcome the organ,zation’s natural 
resistance to change. The role of 
champions was further emphasized by 
Roberts (1968), Chakrabarti ( 1974) and 
Maidique (1980), and by Burgelman (1983), 
who analyzed the path of an internal 
corporate venture through the hierarchy of 
an organization and stressed the need for 
championing at each stage of its progress. 
Of all the factors making for successful 
innovation the existence of a  powerful 
product champion is probably the most 
universally accepted as important. The 
other major factor identified in the 
literature is a  general commitment of top 
management  to innovation (e.g. Roberts, 
1968; Quinn dz Mueller,1963), which may be 
embodied in the practice of managing 
failure as the accepted norm (Bachus, 
1984). 
“one-sided emphasis on either R&D or 
sales does violence to the real complexity 
of the process” (p.127), and that “the test 
of successful entrepreneurship and good 
management  is the capacity to link 
together . . . technical and market pos- 
sibilities. . . . Innovation is a  coupling 
process.” (p. 111) Cooper (1975) advocated 
that the industrial goods firms  that formed 
the subject of his study “must be prepared 
to balance their heavy R&D expenditure 
with marketing research.” Other research 
also backs up this message. Thus Aram 
and Javian (1973) observed that the 
success of customer initiated R&D projects 
was correlated with the existence of a  
direct line of communicat ion between the 
R&D and marketing functions, and a 
number of more general studies in the 
1970s emphasized the importance of the 
structures coordinating between these 
functions for the success of new product 
development ( e.g. Rubinstein and others, 
1976; Souder, 1977). 
The need for coordination between 
marketing and R&D is now well es- 
tablished, and a variety of prescriptions 
have been put forward to this end. 
Broadly speaking, these prescription are of 
two kinds. One kind focuses on 
coordinating structures, and in particular 
on the use of a  matrix organization for 
R&D or, carrying this ! further, of a  
project-based organization for new product 
development in general, with all the 
functional divisions of the organization 
represented in each project team. The 
other kind, dominant in the recent 
prescriptive literature, combines this with 
a  range of “cultural” imperatives extracted 
from the observed practices of exemplary 
“successful” innovating firms, and 
reflecting other trends of research into 
the characteristics of successful innova- 
tion. 
This second body of research has been 
concerned with the barriers to innovation 
experienced in companies, especially in 
large companies, and the characteristics of 
innovating projects that successful ly 
overcome these barriers. Most prominent 
of these characteristics is the need for 
product champions within the firm . Schon 
Most recent prescriptions for the 
successful management  of innovation have 
combined these factors with those 
discussed above, and although the details 
of the prescription vary from guru to guru 
the main features are common to all. The 
need for active collaboration between the 
marketing and R&D functions remains 
central, even if it is sometimes obscured 
by the surrounding cultural rhetoric, and a 
project-based organization is the order of 
the day. But beyond this there is a  call 
for competing project teams with multiple 
approaches, skunk works and developmental 
shoot-outs. Failure is to be managed as 
the norm, but membership of a  successful 
product development team is to be made 
into the key employee goal. Champions are 
to be nurtured and made into corporate 
heroes. Top management  should be visibly 
committed to the innovation process, which 
should be a key component  of a  strongly 
pronounced corporate image. And they 
should also have a strong market 
orientation, which should penetrate and 
act as the driving force for the whole 
organization. (Peters and W a terman, 1982; 
Pascale and Athos, 1981; Quinn, 1985; 
Peters and Austin, 1985; Clifford and 
6 
Cavanagh, 1985; Imae and others, 1984; 
Roberts, 1980). The aim, in the phrase 
coined by Quinn (1985), is “controlled 
chaos”: an environment in which all the 
advantages of small entrepreneurial firms 
are retained at the project level and 
corporate control is provided by the 
management of culture and by a pervasive 
awareness of and deference to the market 
place. 
These prescriptions clearly work for the 
“exemplary” firms on whose practices they 
are based. They clearly relate also to the 
past tradition of research that we have 
outlined above. And they tie in well with 
more recent research results. In particular 
Souder (1987, 1988), in a recently 
published analysis of 289 new product 
innovations in 53 firms, found that the 
most innovative of these firms could be 
characterized organizationally by high 
levels of interaction and communication 
across traditional task boundaries, and by 
the use of organizational commitment in 
place of formal controls. It is also clear, 
however, that the implementation of the 
prescriptions is not straightforward. For 
many firms the prescriptions remain almost 
impossible to enact, and it is far from 
clear how the different components fit 
together. 
The overriding problem is in actually 
implementing the required coordination 
between the R&D and marketing functions. 
A joint project carried out by Arthur 
D.Little and the Industrial Research 
Institute (1973) in the early 1970s 
concluded that the major barriers to the 
success of industrial innovation included 
the coordination between marketing and 
other functional groups. More recently, in 
a study of the interface between marketing 
and R&D in high-technology firms, Gupta 
and others (1985, 1988) found a general 
lack of understanding of how this 
interface ought to function, and strong 
dissatisfaction on the R&D side with the 
way it did. Whereas the marketing 
function sought to control the development 
process, it was not in general prepared to 
share its information. Nor would it take 
on board any ideas generated within R&D 
and seek market opportunities for them. In 
a recent study of ten high-technology 
firms, Bonnet (1986) found that the much- 
vaunted link between R&D and marketing 
was rarely implemented. Even when the 
organization structure allowed for a 
marketing input to the initial project 
assessment it did not allow for a proper 
collaboration during the design phase. 
And in a study of the design process in 
British and American firms Dumas (1988) 
found that functional coordination was 
severely limited by the dominance of the 
marketing function and the reluctance of 
marketing to release their specifications 
early enough to allow time for collabora- 
tive exercises. 
Building on the literature on the sources 
of conflict between functional groups (e.g. 
Walton and Dutton, 1969; Seiler, 1963; 
Dutton and Walton, 1966; Walton and 
others, 1969) , Souder and others have 
explored in detail the organizational 
factors influencing the success or 
otherwise of innovative projects, and have 
focused on the difficulties hindering any 
effective coordination between the R&D 
and marketing functions (Souder, 1977, 
1987, 1988; Rubinstein and others, 1976; 
Souder and Chakrabarti, 1980). Souder 
(1987, 1988) observed that while marketing 
could not understand why R&D could not 
respond immediately to changing 
specifications, R&D could not understand 
why marketing could not fix specifications 
in advance. And from this lack of 
understanding of each other’s worlds arose 
a wide range of grievances and states of 
disharmony ranging for a mere lack of 
interaction to outright distrust. As 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), LaPorte 
(1967) and others have indicated, the two 
functions are typically characterized by 
strongly contrasting organizational 
subcultures, with different values, 
motivations and goals, differing status 
structures and reward systems, and 
differing concepts of procedure and 
control. And far from resolving these 
differences, organizational structures which 
bring the two subcultures into immediate 
contact are also apt to bring them into 
open conflict. Classic sources of 
interdepartmental conflict, such as task- 
related asymmetries and mutual dependen- 
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ties become more visible, and while any 
conflict may be overcome in some cases 
through the creation of a strong project 
identity and commitment, anything short of 
a very strong, and very elusive, degree of 
cohesion in this respect is likely to fatally 
compromise the organizational initiative 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Seiler, 1963; 
Walton and Dutton, 1969). 
Other interfunctional relationships also 
cause problems well recognised in the 
literature on barriers to innovation, but 
scarcely addressed by the prescriptions for 
success. In particular the Arthur D.Little/ 
Industrial Research Institute research 
identified conflicts between the marketing 
and operations functions, while Quinn and 
Mueller (1963) and Burgelman (1983) have 
focused on the problem of transferring 
new product developments from R&D or 
new product development divisions to 
operations. 
To add to these difficulties, the dual 
responsibilities inherent in a matrix or 
project structure can also be problematical. 
Sbragia (1984) and Radosevich and Robles 
(1984) observed difficulties with the 
implementation of matrix structures arising 
from the contradictions generated by dual 
lines of authority, and Joyce (1986) found 
that while the implementation of a matrix 
organization led to an increase in the 
quantity of communication in the organiza- 
tion, it also led to a decrease in its 
quality, and had negative effects on role 
perceptions, work attitudes, and coordina- 
tion. 
The use of a project based organization in 
which the project teams have a high 
degree of autonomy faces not only these 
difficulties but others too. To advocate 
the management of failure is all very well, 
but as Roberts (1980) and Little and 
Sweeting (1984) have pointed out, internal 
new ventures do have a very high failure 
rate. In a survey of top executive 
attitudes to project teams and venture 
groups Hopkins (1975) found that while the 
executives recognized many advantages for 
such organizational structures their 
attitudes were dominated by persistent 
perceived disadvantages. They were worried 
about the difficulty of imposing financial 
control, and about excessive autonomy 
leading to developments that might not fit 
into the company’s overall market strategy. 
They anticipated difficulties in finding the 
right people to head up the teams. In 
short, they were scared of losing control, 
and strongly preferred to stick to a more 
traditional and tightly controlled 
organizational structure. 
Overall it would appear that, while there 
is a large measure of consensus on the 
requirements to be met if a strategy of 
innovation is to be pursued successfully, 
there is relatively little guidance available, 
of any practical use, as to how to go 
about meeting them. You cannot imitate 
3M or Sony by imitating their organiza- 
tional machinery. Matrix or project based 
structures are not universal panaceas. The 
objective recognition of the need for 
project autonomy, loose financial controls, 
and operating flexibility sufficient to allow 
for skunk works, spontaneously arising 
high-performance teams and multiple 
competing approaches, is far from 
equivalent to a subjective preparedness to 
accept the loss of immediate control 
entailed. And above all the call for an 
integration of marketing with research and 
development, or for a combination of a 
strongly marketing-led approach with 
technological freedom, is far removed from 
most firms’ realities of practice. 
Underlying all this is a pervasive 
uncertainty and vagueness about what 
roles the different parts of the prescrip- 
tions play relative to each other, and what 
specific functions each part serves. 
The ush 
If the existing prescriptions are unhelpful 
it is natural to ask whether there might 
be alternative and more practically 
relevant ways of looking at the innovation 
problem, In what follows we shall put 
forward such an alternative view. Before 
doing that, however, it will prove helpful 
to disaggregate the problem in two ways. 
First we shall need to keep separate the 
two principal components underlying the 
existing prescriptions: the need for a 
market-led approach which avoids the 
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dangers of technology-push, and the need 
to overcome the barriers to innovation 
typical of larger companies. Secondly, in 
analyzing the former component, we shall 
find it helpful to distinguish between the 
basic research of a corporate research 
headquarters on one hand, and the major 
part of the firm’s R&D effort, whether in 
the research headquarters or in the 
operating divisions, on the other. When 
people talk of the dangers of technology- 
push and the need for a marketing-led 
approach they do not always mean to 
extend this, other than in a very vague 
sense, to the basic research of a large 
R&D organization: their concern is rather 
that the selection of projects for 
commercial development, and the 
development paths of these projects, 
should be commercially dictated. Many 
would argue that market forces should 
influence more basic research too, but this 
is really a separate issue. Because basic 
research is about exploring the unknown it 
cannot in a strict sense be market-led, nor 
is it technology-driven. Most often it is 
driven by individual interests, hunches and 
curiosities, and if it is to be directed it 
must be so through the choice of 
personnel or the excitation of their 
curiosity. 
From our present viewpoint it is new 
product line development that lies at the 
crux of the innovation problem, and it is 
the need to integrate technological and 
marketing inputs here that leads to the 
prescriptions and problems we have 
outlined. But here too we would argue 
that the concepts of technology-push and 
market-pull are in fact quite inappropriate 
and misleading. To justify and expand on 
this assertion, we consider the results 
from two major case-studies, both 
historical in nature, in which the new 
product development process has been 
intimately researched and analyzed. As 
part of a history of the United Kingdom 
Atomic Energy Authority (AEA), Hendry 
(1988) studied the British nuclear reactor 
research development programme, and in 
particular the process by which the 
advanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR) and 
fast breeder reactor became established as 
the major development’ projects, or 
potential product lines, within the AEA, in 
preference to a range of alternative 
reactor designs. And in a recent book on 
RCA and the videodisc, Graham (1986) 
traced the development of the videodisc 
concept in RCA through its various 
development paths and alternative 
technological realizations to a major 
product launch and subsequent abortion. 
These studies do not in any way constitute 
a representative sample on the basis of 
which we could draw general conclusions 
as to the nature of the new product 
development process. But they do allow us 
to form certain hypotheses as to the 
nature of the problems encountered in this 
process, which can then be tested against 
other evidence. 
Between the end of the Second World War 
and 1959 the AEA and its predecessor 
organization investigated seriously eleven 
different reactor designs as candidates for 
inclusion in the British civil nuclear power 
programme. One of these was the magnox 
reactor originally developed for military 
plutonium production which turned out to 
be a useful power producer as well and 
formed the basis of the first phase of the 
nuclear power programme. Of the 
remaining ten, six had already been 
rejected by 1959, including the pressurized 
water reactor (PWR) which formed the 
basis of the American programme, which 
had, for a substantial period in the mid- 
5Os, occupied pole position in the British 
programme, and which has since been 
reintroduced into the British programme at 
the expense of the AGR in the mid-80s. 
One was carried through to an experimen- 
tal reactor on a prolonged time scale as 
part of a European project, having been 
effectively rejected for the British 
programme. One was carried through to 
the prototype stage in the late 1960s as an 
insurance policy. The remaining two were 
effectively selected as future product lines 
and given development priority: the AGR, 
which duly became the mainstay of the 
power programme in the 1960s and 197Os, 
and the fast reactor, which remained until 
very recently the favoured approach to 
nuclear power development in the longer 
term. 
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Although the continued rejection of the 
PWR design in the 1960s became a matter 
of national political debate (Williams, 
1980), these development decisions, which 
effectively determined the outcome of that 
political debate, are generally portrayed as 
technical ones, based on a combination of 
technological and economic (corresponding 
in this context to market) factors. The 
AGR has always looked a strange choice 
on these criteria, however, and the choice 
of the fast reactor, beset by persistent 
safety and other development problems, 
has also looked increasingly open to 
question. The question addressed by 
Hendry, therefore, was how the develop- 
ment decisions actually came about. And 
the principal conclusion reached was that 
they had little if anything to do with 
either technologically determined choices 
(technology-push), or economic ones 
(market-pull), or indeed any combination 
of these. 
Of the various factors found to influence 
development priority decisions between 
competing reactor types, by far the most 
significant was the political 
existing 
rivalry 
between the two principal 
divisions of the organization, a rivalry 
that was founded on strong cultural 
differences, personal antagonism between 
the division directors, and overlapping 
frames of reference. Although the 
organization structure changed through 
time it remained the case that one 
division, academically-oriented and based 
in the South of England near Oxford, was 
responsible for research while another, 
industrially-oriented and based in the 
Industrial North-West, was responsible for 
development. When responsibilities were 
specified, the research division were 
deemed responsible for the’inauguration of 
new reactor projects and for carrying 
them through to the stage of low-power 
reactor experiments. The industrial 
division were then responsible for carrying 
them through to the prototype stage. The 
distinction between an experimental and a 
prototype reactor was however unclear, 
and the situation was complicated by 
safety factors (implying geographical 
decisions) and resource constraints. In 
practice decisions were dominated by four 
‘. .,I I,.!“, -, ‘; ; >I 
factors: the political rule of;;a London 
based chairman, controlling Me rival 
directors by giving way to each ?f14 
the use made of this procedure by the 
divisions (e.g. by putting up artificial 
proposals immediately before serious ones); 
the recommendations of a small and ill- 
informed group in the London office, 
determined largely by the interactions of 
their own subculture with those of the 
divisions; and the effective power of veto 
wielded by the industrial group, who could 
always find reasons not to pursue any 
project they wished beyond the experimen- 
tal stage. 
Of the remaining factors, two involved 
technology, but only indirectly. 
Developments in America, whenever they 
became known about, always exerted an 
influence on decision making in Britain, 
the presumption being that anything the 
Americans liked must be promising. 
American intelligence was however 
incomplete and unsystematic, and its effect 
bore little relation to the underlying state 
of affairs in the American programme. 
The technical preferences of key 
individuals and groups within the divisions, 
based largely on their own selective 
experience, were also significant. Engineers 
who had experienced the difficulties of 
working with high pressures tended to 
favour unpressurized systems using liquid 
coolants, while those with experience of 
corrosion problems preferred the use of 
relatively inert gases at higher tempera- 
tures. Within the research division, each 
reactor type found its sponsors, typically, 
from within the scientific discipline most 
crucial for its analysis: there was, in 
effect, a physicists’ reactor, a metallur- 
gists’ reactor, and a chemists’ reactor. A 
fourth significant factor was political 
activity within the divisions, in particular 
the activities of a group within the 
industrial division but unsympathetic to its 
culture and preferences. A fifth was 
international politics. European cooperation 
on nuclear matters was a major political 
issue, and the crucial marketing issue of 
whether Britain was to develop reactors 
for her own use only, or reactors for 
export as well, was severely complicated 
by international political pressures. 
( ‘* 
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That these factors could assume the 
importance they did was facilitated by a 
widespread but rarely noticed feature of 
development programmes, namely their 
tendency to operate in cycles of rapid 
advance and stagnation, optimism and 
pessimism. In the case of nuclear reactor 
development the high points tended to 
come with the completion of a feasibility 
study and the actual construction of an 
experiment or prototype. The low points 
came in the early stages of each 
development phase when the technical 
problems, always considerable, rather than 
the possibilities or achievements were 
dominant. The outcome of any project 
comparison was strongly dependent on the 
relative states of the projects being 
compared, and this was a major source of 
both intended and unintended priority 
decisions. 
Finally, the whole decision making process 
was strongly conditioned by a set of 
supposedly technological classifications 
that were, once established, maintained 
socially beyond the point where they had 
any technological relevance. In particular 
the reactor types were persistently 
classified into liquid cooled versus gas 
cooled on one hand, and “fast” versus 
“thermal” (relating to the speed of the 
neutrons in the reactor core) on the other. 
Both dichotomies made technological sense 
when first made, as the fast reactor was 
in the 1940s the only reactor type likely 
to be self-sustaining in fissile material (a 
breeder reactor), while the early liquid and 
gas-cooled designs had very different 
requirements in terms of their needs of 
fissile material, then in very short supply. 
By the time the key decisions were made 
in the 195Os, however, both had ceased to 
be relevant. Several of the designs under 
consideration were thermal breeders, and 
the differences between the fissile material 
needs of gas and water cooled reactors 
were no longer either significant or 
consistent. The classifications continued to 
dominate choice procedures, however, with 
the effect, for example, that the fast 
reactor was never critically evaluated 
against competing breeder reactors, and 
retained its place in the programme more 
or less by default. 
The factors influencing design decisions 
within the individual projects were very 
similar. Individual or group preferences 
arising out of specific experience, inter- 
and intra-divisional politics, and personal 
rivalry and antagonisms were again 
prominent. In a situation where, typically, 
each of the available options entailed 
major development uncertainties the 
relative risks of which could not be 
objectively evaluated, decisions had to rely 
on guesswork as to the time scale in 
which problems could be solved and the 
extent to which they could be overcome, 
and while the majority of design decisions 
reflected some sort of consensus, many of 
the most significant ones did not. 
Both at the project and at the corporate 
levels, of course, many decisions were 
made as a result of straight-forward 
technical evaluations. But the important 
thing is that many were not, and could 
not be. Rival technical opinions had 
therefore to compete in a political 
framework, in which such devices as the 
manipulation of committees, the use of 
paper projects to put down other ones, the 
use of multiple proposals to get one 
proposal through, the setting up of 
projects to divert participants from the 
point of attack, and even the attribution 
of papers to authors who had no 
knowledge of their contents, were all 
adopted at one time or another. 
A national nuclear reactor development 
programme may seem a long way removed 
from the innovation problems of an 
industrial corporation. But while Graham’s 
account of RCA and the videodisc reveals 
little of the underhand politics of the 
AEA, the determinants of the development 
process are nevertheless very similar in 
kind. 
The period of videoplayer development in 
RCA (roughly 1963-1981) was one of 
considerable turmoil for the company as a 
whole, and executive responsibilities and 
organizational structures changed 
frequently. Broadly speaking, however, the 
development process involved the 
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Corporate Research Centre laboratories, 
the Consumer Electronics Division, the 
Records Division, and Corporate Head- 
quarters, each with its own culture and 
priorities. And it involved four major 
videoplayer technologies: magnetic tape, 
holographic tape, advanced coated discs 
using electron-beam recording and 
capacitance pick-up, and more traditional 
discs using electromechanical recording 
methods. The videoplayer project as a 
whole came to the fore when the 
laboratories were reorganized along end- 
product lines, with their own New Business 
and Research Evaluation group. A few 
years later, in 1968-9, a major corporate 
reorganization drastically reduced the 
independence of the laboratories from the 
operating divisions and introduced a strong 
corporate marketing department and 
advanced product planning organization. 
Major priority decisions were taken out of 
the hands of the laboratories themselves. 
Each of the four main technologies had its 
advantages and drawbacks, and each 
encountered major development problems, 
but as for nuclear reactors in Britain none 
was objectively superior from a tech- 
nological viewpoint, or from a combined 
technical-marketing viewpoint. As in the 
nuclear case too, the development of each 
project tended to be cyclical. If things 
were progressing rapidly, funds were 
committed, confidence and enthusiasm 
soared and so did results. This tended, 
however, to lead to over-optimistic 
expectations from outside the project, and 
to high project visibility, often resulting 
in severe disruption, and a failure to meet 
targets. Doubts would then set in, funds 
be withdrawn, and morale and progress 
decline. Moreover, two of the four 
technologies were sponsored by the 
laboratories, one by the Consumer 
Electronics Division, and one by the 
Record division. And within the R&D 
structure too, several of the key figures 
had their own pet projects. 
In these circumstances, theoretical priority 
decisions appear to have been dominated 
by three forces: the implications for RCA’s 
public image in the face of successive 
product announcements by their com- 
petitors; the source from which informa- 
tion was solicited; and within the 
laboratories the state of the fluctuating 
political battle between 
the fundamental research school of thought 
which had dominated in the 1950s and 
early 196Os, and the applications school 
which had dominated before the war and 
was enjoying something of a revival in the 
period concerned. The practical outcomes 
were dominated by the political balance 
between the divisions, and by the 
prevailing mood in the laboratories. 
The holographic tape, employing state-of- 
the-art laser technology, was always a 
laboratory favourite, but did not have the 
support of a powerful R&D champion. It 
was developed as a low priority, and was 
indeed seen by some as no more than an 
attempt to appease the “scientists” who 
had been threatened by the laboratory 
reorganization. But in the wake of the new 
aggressive marketing image introduced in 
1968, of the announcement of a video- 
player project by RCA’s arch broadcasting 
rivals CBS, and of the failure by RCA to 
win a prestigious contract for a colour 
television camera for Apollo 11, corporate 
headquarters decided on the need for an 
urgent new product launch, and holo- 
graphic tape was the only project capable 
of being developed to the demonstration 
stage in the timescale specified. This was 
not because it was more advanced, but 
because its problems lay in cost reduction 
and production facilities rather than in 
meeting a performance specification. The 
marketing people were quickly taken in by 
their own rhetoric, however, and it became 
the subject of a major development and 
launch programme, only to flounder when 
the operating divisions found that it was 
not so far advanced as they had been led 
to believe and the laboratories, who had 
had to stop real development work in the 
interests of the demonstration, had no 
ready response to their critics. The 
artificially generate optimism increased the 
political vulnerability of the project, which 
its opponents in the divisions and the 
laboratories (who each had their own 
preferred alternatives) were soon able to 
axe altogether. 
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In contrast to holographic tape, magnetic 
tape was seen in the laboratories as an old 
hat technology with little scope for 
development. But RCA had a strong 
tradition in magnetic tape technology, and 
the project soon found a sponsor in the 
Consumer Electronics Division, where 
development continued at first in isolation 
from the main videoplayer effort and later 
in competition with holographic tape. The 
project was eventually run down in 1974 
as a result of coordinating problems with 
Bell and Howell, who had been commis- 
sioned to produce the tape transport 
mechanisms, the removal of the overall 
videoplayer project coordinating team from 
headquarters to the division, from where 
they were unable to secure the cooperation 
of other parts of the organization, and the 
commissioning by headquarters of a report 
from the Vice-President, Research and 
Engineering, who was a long-time opponent 
of magnetic tape. It was eventually axed 
altogether when Sony demonstrated their 
betamax, which was too far in advance of 
the RCA project to be .seriously chal- 
lenged, and in 1977 the division began 
marketing the Matsushita VHS magnetic 
tape system. 
The more technically sophisticated of the 
disc systems originated from one of the 
more applied groups in the laboratories, 
but being too conservative for the 
scientists and too scientifically demanding 
for the inventors it at first found little 
support. The electron-beam recording it 
adopted was originally chosen as a 
research tool, because it left open crucial 
issues on which the team could not make 
up their minds, but it found an influential 
champion in the Vice-President, Research 
and Engineering, and was able to survive 
without really getting anywhere until the 
debacle over holographic tape opened up 
all options. As the least well developed of 
the available options it then received 
substantial funding to enable it to catch 
up so that proper comparisons could be 
made, and this naturally produced high 
morale and results. When a decision was 
made between disc and holographic tape 
projects, the momentum of the former 
compared with the stagnation of the latter 
effectively determined the outcome, even 
though these states were quite artificially 
produced. Problems arose for the disc 
project when, as effectively the sole 
remaining videoplayer project, it began to 
be transferred to the operating divisions. 
After its previous experiences, especia!ly 
with magnetic tape, Consumer Electronics 
Division was internally divided and in no 
mood to take on anybody’s new project. 
(It also had its hands full with television 
developments.) Records division, who would 
be responsible for the disc production 
process, resisted strongly the loading of 
all the main problems - electron-beam 
recording, triple-coated discs and 
capacitance pick-up - into their ball-park 
after minimal previous consultation, and 
argued strongly for their abandonment in 
favour of a more traditional electro- 
mechanical system, closer to that with 
which they were familiar in audio 
recording. Development of the original 
project was held up sufficiently to force 
adoption of the more traditional 
alternative as the only way of getting out 
a product fast enough to meet the 
emerging competition. In 1981 a pre- 
recorded videoplayer using electromechani- 
tally produced vinyl discs was launched- 
and flopped. 
The AGR, fast reactor and RCA videodisc 
were expensive product failures, but that 
is not the point to be made here. In the 
case of RCA in particular the failure can 
be attributed to corporate problems arising 
from a preceding failure in the emerging 
computer business, and to a marketing 
error (the choice of a player with no 
recording facilities, which would generate 
income through the sale of pre-recorded 
programs, rather than of a more versatile 
tape recorder) that was shared by many of 
its competitors, without recourse to the 
features on which we have focused here. 
The point we wish to make is that these 
features were pervasive and persistent, 
that they are to some extent characteristic 
of any development process, and that when 
looking at the general efficiency of such a 
process they are extremely significant. 
The oolitics of innovation 
The image of the development process that 
13 
is revealed by the above studies is 
overwhelmingly a political one. The choice 
of the AGR and fast reactor was 
determined neither by technological nor by 
economic imperatives, nor indeed by any 
combination of the two, but by a process 
of political negotiation based on the 
rivalry between different cultural 
subgroups within the organization. The 
technological preferences of the different 
interest groups were to a large extent 
socially created and were certainly socially 
maintained, reflecting the values, 
objectives and experiences of the groups 
and, where appropriate, their political 
structures in terms of subgroups. The 
choices of successive videoplayer projects 
at RCA were likewise the result of 
political processes involving competing 
cultures and interest groups. In both 
cases, moreover, attempts to manage the 
processes by the imposition of controls 
resulted, almost inevitably, in a destructive 
backlash as the interest groups concerned 
exerted their powers of veto or found 
ways of manipulating the control process. 
In a political framework the powers of 
coercion are always limited, and both cases 
illustrate this well. The problem rather is 
to somehow free people from their habitual 
cultural, political and cognitive constraints, 
and so to make possible a genuine 
dialogue. 
Of course, the two cases studied here may 
be quite exceptional. Since we know of no 
other studies of comparable depth we 
cannot say. But they do suggest strongly 
that the problem of innovation might 
profitably be approached from the existing 
literature on the political and cultural 
aspects of organizations, and especially on 
the problem of implementing change in 
organizations; and that the literature on 
the management of innovation might 
profitably be interpreted from a political 
perspective. 
If we look at the literature on the cultural 
and political aspects of organizational 
change we find much that is relevant to 
out present discussion. For example Riley 
(1983) bases her structurationist analysis 
of organizations on the argument that an 
organization should be viewed not as a 
single unified culture, as popular accounts 
and prescriptions for the management of 
innovation would have it, but as a system 
of politically integrated subcultures. A 
similar perspective is also adopted by 
Thompson and Wildavsky (1984) in their 
study of the cultural basis of information 
rejection and distortion mechanisms in 
organizations, and placed on an empirical 
footing by Gregory (1983) and van Maanen 
and Barley (1985). A wide range of 
authors have drawn attention to the 
powerful psychological (Mitroff, 1983; 
Mitroff and Mason, 1982; Johnson, 1987), 
cultural (Lorsch, 1976; Schein, 1985)), or 
political (Guth and MacMillan, 1986; 
Mintzberg, 1985; Greiner, 1986) barriers to 
the implementation of strategic change. In 
a series of detailed studies of organiza- 
tional change processes Mumford and 
Pettigrew (1975) and Pettigrew (1973,1985) 
have presented these processes throughout 
as political ones. Hickson and others 
(1986) have emphasized the political 
character of strategic decision making as 
revealed in a large sample of case 
histories. Of particular significance in our 
present context, Wilson (1981) has 
described some political aspects of 
technological decision making in a 
chemical company. And Pfeffer (1981) has 
offered a detailed analysis of political 
processes in organizations which 
incorporates many of the factors 
highlighted in our two case studies 
(Hendry, 1989). 
But if both the product development 
process and the change processes which 
might be introduced to influence it are 
fundamentally political in nature, then this 
nature must surely be recognised in any 
practicable prescriptive model for the 
management of innovation. It is scarcely, 
surprising if structural prescriptions such 
as those for matrix or project based 
organizations are not in themselves 
sufficient. And while the more complex 
culturally-oriented models, based as they 
are on observed best practice, naturally 
come closer to reality in this respect, they 
too are apt to be sterile without some 
explicit analysis of the political sig- 
nificance of the measures they recommend, 
and some explicit guidance as to how the 
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politics of their implementation is to be 
managed. 
The academic discussion of these sorts of 
issues has been conducted not so much in 
terms of poiicics (the massive literature on 
power in organizations has rarely ventured 
into the analysis of process), but in terms 
of corporate culture, and it is in these 
terms that the recipes for innovation 
success may be related to our analysis. 
Despite the immense popularity of 
“corporate culture” in recent years, many 
people remain skeptical of it as a useful 
concept. Some people have questioned 
whether a concept drawn from the 
anthropology of small, simple and primitive 
societies can possibly be applied to the 
complexities of modern multinational 
businesses (see Morey and Luthans, 1985). 
Others have questioned the feasibility of 
changing or imposing cultural norms, which 
are almost by definition very deeply-based 
and historically rooted (Weick, 1983; Siehl, 
1985; Lundberg, 1985; and see Pascale, 
1985; Ray, 1986). The confusion arising in 
these areas is largely removed, however, 
when we remember first, that the problem 
with which we are faced concerns the 
dynamic interaction between rival 
subcultures in the firm rather than the 
transformation of a single monolithic 
culture; and secondly, that while all 
corporate cultures and subcultures are 
certainly complex, the great majority of 
that complexity lies within the common 
cultural characteristics of Western 
industrial society. The deviations from this 
common culture to be found in organiza- 
tions and their subgroups are not in 
general complex. And as Pascale (1985) has 
observed the process of socialization to 
prescribed cultural norms takes place all 
the time, indeed every time a new recruit 
is inducted into an organization. The 
removal of cultural barriers or constraints, 
or the wholesale introduction of a new 
“company spirit” are more problematic, but 
they are political processes like any other 
and have direct counterparts in society at 
large (see e.g. Soeters, 1986). 
From the political viewpoint the chief 
characteristic of the innovation process is 
that it involves collaboration between rival 
interest groups. Usually this will include 
interest groups with generally similar 
cultural backgrounds (and operating within 
the same functional divisions), but with 
different personal or social values or 
goals, different professional backgrounds, 
or competing political interests. Almost 
always it will include groups with 
contrasting cultural backgrounds, radically 
differing experiences, and different status 
and reward environments. One way of 
managing such collaborations is by political 
compromise, keeping the interest groups at 
arms length and resolving differences by 
negotiation or when all else fails by 
arbitrary dictat. To do this, however, is 
to effectively ignore the external 
environment, communication with which is 
in general split between the interest 
groups rather than concentrated at the 
centre, and this is scarcely a recipe for 
commercial success. The alternative is to 
manage by consensus, not necessarily in 
the organization as a whole but in some 
way at least across the principal political 
divisions. If a project or venture team is 
to be assembled, for example, the 
commitment to the project, or to the firm, 
must be sufficient to override the conflict 
automatically engendered by bringing the 
rival interest groups into close contact. 
One way to approach this problem is to 
focus on the glue binding teams together, 
and it would appear to be this approach 
that underlies the success of the recent 
prescriptions for managing innovation. A 
strong corporate image binds people 
together. So does a perceived commitment 
on behalf of top management to the 
innovation process. A preparedness to 
allow project teams to form spontaneously 
and the encouragement of competition 
between teams both serve to strengthen 
team bonding. Indeed the encouragement 
of conflict between groups (i.e. between 
project teams) is probably the fastest and 
most effective way of reducing conflict 
within them (i.e. between functions). And 
while it imposes its own problems, 
especially in terms of the management of 
failure, these are at least manageable. So 
long as the structure of political conflict 
separates vital elements of expertise, such 
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as those held by the research and 
marketing specialists, nothing is 
manageable for there is nothing to manage. 
These binding effects are important. But 
they are also limited. A strongly 
proclaimed set of corporate cultural norms 
informs people what is expected of them, 
and provides a foundation for bonding in 
terms of shared perceptions. But it can 
only act as an effective unifier if it is 
specific enough to direct people’s 
behaviour, and that brings us back to our 
original problems. Unless there is some 
other means of coordinating research and 
marketing, for example, corporate culture 
must favour one or the other, or be 
irrelevant to the innovation process. 
Within the framework of the existing 
prescriptions a corporate commitment to 
innovation per se can only work in 
conjunction with the use of autonomous 
and competing project teams, and these 
raise the issues of control we discussed 
earlier. Any organization needs some form 
of control over its activities, and if this is 
not to be operated through a tight 
corporate structure there must be some 
overriding discipline, be it financially or 
more broadly marketing based, which will 
again upset the balance of the innovation 
process. Or else an organization must be 
prepared to take genuine risks. Of the 
exemplary companies used as the basis for 
existing prescriptions, many are actually 
market-led, and while this approach is 
reaping short-term harvests, its long-term 
viability remains open to question (see also 
Quinn and McGrath, 1985). Others are 
actually risk-takers, but while it may be 
necessary to take risks in order to 
optimize the chances of survival this is an 
approach that is unlikely to be widely 
imitated, at least so long as there p~~ear 
to be more comfortable options. 
The use of corporate glue to overcome the 
sources of conflict would appear, then, to 
be valuable but limited in its scope. There 
is, however, a second possible approach 
which has the considerable virtue of 
striking to the heart of the matter, and 
that is to seek the actual reduction of the 
sources of conflict. This approach is 
virtually absent from the existing 
prescriptions, but if our image of the 
development process is a valid one it 
would appear to have a major and 
significant role to play. 
How can conflict, and in particular that 
endemic between marketing and R&D 
groups, be reduced? There is of course a 
vast literature on conflict in organizations, 
but relatively little of it concerns the 
conflict between departments or 
professional groups. Even that which does 
(Blake and Mouton, 1964; Walton and 
Dutton, 1969; Seiler, 1963; Dutton and 
Walton, 1966; LaPorte, 1967; Walton and 
others, 1969; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Souder, 1977, 1987, 1988; and see Katz and 
Kahn, 1978) has for the most part very 
little to offer on the subject of conflict 
resolution. Indeed the only significant 
contribution on this theme would seem to 
be that of Souder (1987, 1988), who offers 
a range of “guidelines for promoting 
harmony”, some (though not all) of which 
are practicably applicable as conflict 
reduction measures. Following Walton and 
others (1969), Souder (1977, 1987, 1988) 
also advocates the development of 
integrating lateral relationships within an 
organizational development setting, giving 
some evidence in support of a procedure 
which involves alternating periods of 
nominal (side by side) and interacting 
(face to face) group activities. 
The literature is meagre, but this would 
seem largely to be due to the fact that 
while one group of writers have been more 
interested in the conflict than its 
resolution, the other has confused the 
manifestations of conflict removal with 
their causes. If one takes care to avoid 
this confusion, there are in fact some 
relatively obvious ways of going about the 
reduction of conflict, especially through 
the use of training programmes, and 
through the introduction of what Souder 
terms “dyadic relationships”, strong 
personal links between individuals in the 
different functions which serve as channels 
of communication, understanding and 
collaboration. 
1. Group development programmes such 
16 
as that proposed by 
Souder, in which the timing and extent 
of integration and retreat can be 
managed by development experts, have 
an obvious part to play. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Common socialization processes, and 
in particular common training 
programmes for marketing and R&D 
recruits, should serve both to 
strengthen the glue of an 
overriding corporate culture and to 
reduce conflict through the 
provision of shared experience. 
The recruitment of science and 
engineering graduates to the 
marketing function, either directly 
or through a period in the R&D 
function, should help to overcome 
one of the major communication 
barriers between the two functions, 
and with it a large element of 
mistrust and suspicion. 
Job rotation programmes or similar 
schemes, if sufficiently widespread, 
should further strengthen 
interdepartmental understanding, 
both through shared experiences 
and through the building of 
personal linkages. 
Strong social and recreational 
programmes have a part to play not 
only in enhancing corporate 
belonging but also in encouraging 
personal cross-functional links. 
Common status and reward systems 
should also remove a major source 
of conflict. For an organization 
starting with a mixture of systems 
(by research ability, management 
ability, seniority, market shortage, 
etch this will inevitably entail 
costs as some groups are paid over 
the previous “going rate”, and may 
also entail some staff losses. But 
the costs should be mitigated by 
improvements in quality and should 
be substantially outweighed by the 
benefits. Moreover, since reward 
systems provide one of the most 
visible demonstrations of the values 
of the organization the careful 
management of relative rewards 
should anyway be a top organiza- 
tional priority. 
7. Of crucial importance, but rarely 
discussed, is the rale played by the 
design function. In some firms the 
presence of a design department 
serves merely to complicate the 
political situation, while in others it 
is virtually an irrelevance, ignored 
so far as possible by both marketing 
and R&D. But given the appropriate 
authority it can play an important 
coordinating role, and indeed must 
do so if the product design process 
is to be successful. As Hendry and 
Dumas (1988) have argued, an 
autonomous design department, 
independent of the marketing 
function and with sufficient internal 
authority not to be ignored by that 
function can serve both to improve 
end product design and to speed up 
and facilitate the collaborative new 
product development process. This is 
also an area in which external 
consultants can be used to good 
effect, their freedom from the 
organizational structure allowing 
them to create communication 
channels and bonds between the 
different functions. 
8. More ambitiously, but not necessari- 
ly impracticably so, a range of 
specific training and organizational 
development programmes might be 
used to change the very nature of 
the functions themselves, and 
particularly of the marketing 
function. 
Leaving aside the last point for a moment, 
there is nothing radically new in these 
suggestions. All are already implemented to 
some extent in some firms. But they do 
not form part of the established recipes 
for innovative success. Do they work? It 
is too early to give a definitive answer. It 
is a striking observation, however, that 
they are all characteristic of successful 
Japanese technology-based firms, without 
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being in any way specific to a Japanese 
culture (Imae and others, 1984; Ohmae, 
1985; Pascale and Athos, 1981). Job 
rotation and common reward systems are 
in some respects easier to operate in that 
culture, but they are also found, in 
different forms, in Western firms. The 
Japanese education system also simplifies 
the recruitment of scientifically trained 
marketing and operations staff and the use 
of the R&D function as a staff resource 
pool on which other functions can draw. 
But again there is nothing in principle to 
prevent Western corporations from 
adopting similar policies, 
What all this points to is a form of 
organization that is marketing centred, but 
is nevertheless technologically literate, and 
more specifically design-literate, through 
and through. Picking up on point (8) 
above, this suggests a new role for the 
marketing function. In a recent paper, 
Miles and Snow (1986) claim to identify 
the emergence of a new form of 
organizational structure designed to cope 
with the increasingly competitive and 
rapidly changing markets and technologies 
characteristic of the present era. These 
“dynamic networks” are characterised by 
vertical disaggregation, with market 
mechanisms and full information disclosure 
systems taking the place of the close 
linkages and trust characteristic of more 
traditional organizational forms: a move 
from hierarchies to internal markets. The 
key figures in these structures are 
“brokers”, dealing as in a market place 
with the four separate constituencies of 
suppliers, producers, designers and 
distributors. 
How representative, and indeed how 
desirable, this model is open to question, 
but it does provide a provocative extreme 
representation of an organization in which 
interfunctional linkages and trust cannot 
be relied upon, as is often the case in the 
technology-based firm. And it prompts the 
question: who are the brokers? They can 
only be the marketing function, and if 
that function is to play the central role in 
a disaggregated organization, it should 
perhaps do so also in the more closely 
knit firm to which we are aspiring here. 
Leonard-Barton and Kraus (1985) and 
Simmonds (1986) have both argued strongly 
for an internal as well as an external role 
for the marketing function, and such a 
role would provide a natural organizational 
setting for that most crucial of ingredients 
for innovation success, the product 
champion. It would seem in many respects 
to be precisely what is needed for the 
management of innovation. 
As we have already noted, there are many 
advocates of a marketing-led approach to 
innovation, but these generally assume a 
traditional externally-oriented marketing 
function using its knowledge of the 
external market to specify development 
targets. An internal marketing role 
implies a knowledge of the interior of the 
organization, including the R&D and 
operating functions, equal to that of the 
external environment. It implies, in 
particular, a detailed knowledge of the 
technological capabilities, preferences and 
trajectories existing in the organization, as 
well as of their cultural settings and 
political structuring. This in turn would 
require radically new forms of training and 
avenues of recruitment for marketing 
personnel. If the function is to exercise 
properly the powers it is being afforded in 
contemporary organizations, however, such 
changes may well be necessary. 
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